Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 6
Issue 3 Issue 3 - April 1953

Article 7

4-1953

That Elusive Word, "Residence"
Willis L.M. Reese
Robert S. Green

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Conflict of Laws Commons

Recommended Citation
Willis L.M. Reese and Robert S. Green, That Elusive Word, "Residence", 6 Vanderbilt Law Review 561
(1953)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol6/iss3/7

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

THAT ELUSIVE WORD, "RESIDENCE"
WILLIS L.M. REESE* AND ROBERT S. GREENt

If wishes were horses, all men could ride. And if judges were legislators, the laws would probably read differently than they do. At

least, this might well be the case in the field under discussion. With
few exceptions, the courts speak of "domicil" while statutes refer to
"residence" instead.' Domicil has a reasonably constant meaning. 2
Residence, on the other hand, is one of the most variable words in the
legal dictionary. 3 It can be synonymous with domicil; it can also

mean something else or something more. As such, it must be further
defined, something which rarely is satisfactorily done in the statutes
*

Professor of Law, Columbia University; member New York Bar.

f LL.B. Columbia University, 1953; law clerk to U. S. Circuit Judge Harold R.
Medina.
1. At times, statutes use inhabitant, inhabitancy, legal resident, actual or
bona fide resident, and so forth, instead of residence. These terms are normally
interpreted as being synonymous with residence. See, e.g., Glass v. Glass, 260
Mass. 562, 157 N.E. 621 (1927).
Only a few states use the word domicil extensively in their statutes. See, e.g.,
GA. CODE ANN'. §§ 102-103, 79-401 et seq. (1937); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 3846 (1945). Occasionally other states employ the word in particular statutes.
Thus, for example, domicil is sometimes used to determine the law governing
personal property [ CAL. CiV. CODE § 946 (1949); IDAHO CODE ANN. tit. 55, § 401
(1949) ] to establish the qualification of voters [FLA. STAT. ANN. § 98.01 (1943)],
or eligibility for old age insurance [IowA CODE ANN. § 249.6 (1949) ],in probate
provision [N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1, 47-6 (1950); ORE. ComP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 20-152 to 20-156 (1940)], and divorce laws [IDAHO CODE ANN. tit. 32, § 702
(1949); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-97 (1950) ],and in statutes providing for the interstate settlement of death-tax disputes [MAss. ANN.LAws c. 65 B (1945); VT.
REV.STAT. §1132 (1947)].
Even where the statutes use "domicil," they sometimes mean something else.
Thus a Texas statute which provides that, with some exceptions, an inhabitant
of the state shall be sued in "the county in which he has his domicile" [TEx.
REV.'CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (1950)] has been interpreted by a long line of
Texas cases as meaning that while a settled connection with a particular county
is necessary, the elements of "technical" or "legal" domicil are not. See
Snyder v. Pitts, 241 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1951), and cases discussed therein. See
also District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441, 62 Sup. Ct. 303, 86 L. Ed. 329
(1941), interpreting a District of Columbia income tax statute.
Sorretimes the words domicil and residence are used in the same statutory
provision as "residence or domicil" or "residence and domicil." In some cases
these words are held to be used synonymously. Barrow v. Barrow, 160 La.
91, 106 So. 705 (1925) (venue); People v. Acritelli, 507 Misc. 574, 110 N.Y.
Supp. 130 (Gen. Sess. 1908) (elections). In others they are considered complementary. In re Lemen, 208 Fed. 80 (N.D. Ohio 1912) (bankruptcy); Kemp v.
Kemp, 172 Misc. 738, 16 N.Y.S.2d 26 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1939) (support).
2. This is not to say that domicil means exactly the same thing in all contexts. See the debate on this subject before the American Law Institute during
its consideration of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws. 3 PROCEEDINGS A.L.I.
231 (1925). And see Coox, LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFI.CT OF LAWS
c.7 (1942).
3. Residence has been referred to as "a single term of broad and ill-defined
content having no exact legal meaning." Goodrich, J., in United States v.
Stabler, 169 F.2d 995, 998 (3d Cir. 1948).
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themselves.4 The courts must therefore interpret it as best they can
without any indication of the legislative intent other than that which
can be derived from the purpose underlying the enactment in question.5 The consistent appearance of residence in statutes is difficult to
explain. For legislators are frequently lawyers, and it is impossible
to believe that all of them are unaware of the ambiguities and complexities which use of the term involves.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the various meanings attributed to residence in its principal statutory settings. The trail has
already been well blazed by Professor Beale in an early article,6 but
it is believed that the importance of the subject warrants its reexamination in the light of modern developments. Before doing so, however, a few words should be said on the subject of domicil. This is essential not only for purposes of comparison, but also because residence
and domicil are so frequently held to be identical.
In the great majority of cases, a person's domicil is in the state with
which he is most intimately connected. This is the state where he
4.A few statutes give general definitions of residence, often in terms that
make it substantially equivalent to domicil. See, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 77-201 (Subpar. 23) (1935); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 1.020 (1939); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN.§ 83-303 (1947); N.D. REV. CODE § 54-0126 (1943). Cf. NEV. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 6405 (1929).
Many statutes define, or give rules for determining, residence for particular purposes. Thus, the residence required to qualify under the election
law is frequently defined. See, e.g., COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 59, § 213 (1935); ILL.
REV. STAT. c. 46, § 3-2 (1949); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117.020 (Baldwin 1943);
MICH.COMP. LAWS § 145.9 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 201.32 (West 1946); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 56-101 (1941); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 163-25 (1943); Omo CODE
ANN. §§ 4785-31 to 4785-33 (1948); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2814 (1938); VT.
REV. STAT. §§ 103-105 (1947); Wis. STAT. § 6.51 (1951). So, too, are rules often
given for determining residence within the meaning of various types of taxation
statutes. See, e.g., Am. CODE ANN. § 73-1504 (1939) ; ARx.STAT. ANN. tit. 84, §
2002(9) (1947); IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.4(8) (19495; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
132-010 (Baldwin 1943); MINN.STAT. ANN. § 290-01 (West 1947); N.J. STAT.
ANN.§ 54:4-3.12i (1952 Supp.); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 76-1203 (1941); OnE. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 110-1402, 110-1602 (1940); VA.CODE ANN.§§ 58-5, 58-6 (1950);
Wis. STAT. § 71.01 (1949). And see income tax statutes cited note 76 infra.
Residence is sometimes defined in welfare statutes. See, e.g., IOWA CODE
ANN.§ 249.1 (1949); Mci. COMP. LAWS § 400.55 (1948); ORE. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 126-109 (1940); VT. REv. STAT. § 7097 (1947); Wis. STAT. § 49.10 (1951).
Other examples of statutes defining residence for particular purposes include,
to name but a few, provisions for homestead and other exemptions [FLA. STAT.
§ 192.14 (1949); IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.2 (1949)], liquor control laws [IOwA
CODE ANN.§ 123.5(8) (1949); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 436.2 (1948)1, and requirements for fish and game licenses [AR. STAT. ANN. tit. 47 §§ 201, 209 (1947);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 11-1802 (Burns 1942 Replacement Vol.); OHIO CODE ANN. §
1390 (1948); VT. REv. STAT. § 6316 (1947)].
By and large, these statutory definitions provide little assistance in deciding
whether or not residence should be treated as synonymous with domicil.
5. "'Reside' and 'residence' are terms whose statutory meaning depends
upon the context and purpose of the statute in which they occur." In re Jones
341 Pa. 329, 332, 19 A.2d 280, 282 (1941). To the same effect, see, e.g., Russell
v. Holland, 309 Mass. 187, 190, 34 N.E.2d 668, 670 (1941); In re Shun T. Takahashi's Estate, 113 Mont. 490, 497, 129 P.2d 217, 221 (1942).
6. Beale, Residence and Domicil, 4 IOwA L. BULL. 3 (1918). Much of the
material incorporated in that article is to be found in 1 BEALE, COFLICT OF
LAWS 109-22 (1935). See also KENNAN,RESIDENCE AND DOMICIL (1934).
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lives and has his home. And, of all lay words, "home" does undoubtedly
have a meaning most closely akin to the legal conception of domicil. Unfortunately, however, the two terms cannot be considered synonymous.
The law of a person's domicil determines certain of his most important
rights and obligations. For this reason, everyone must have a domicil
and, at least for the same purpose, no one can have more than one
domicil at a time.7 On the other hand, some men have no home at all
in the ordinary sense, while others, speaking in common parlance,
have two or more. 8 Also, on the grounds of their legal incapacity,
special rules provide for the assignment of a domicil to infants 9 and
insane persons 10 which, in actual practice, sometimes result in the
location of the domicil in a state other than that of the actual home.
Lastly, a person may change his abode to another state without satisfying the technical requirements for the acquisition of a new domicil
of choice." In such instances again the place of a person's home may
be different from that of his domieil.
Domicil, at any rate, is a fairly meaningful term. Normally, it is to
be found in the state with whi-ch the individual in question is most
closely connected. And where this is not the case, special rules of law
that have been developed during past centuries aid in its determina12
t4on.
Residence, on the other hand, is an extremely uncertain word. In
its legal sense, it undoubtedly requires at least a rather well-settled
connection with a community. A visit or mere sojurn is not enough. 13
Nor is presence under compulsion sufficient. 14 There is, however, wide
variation among the decisions as to what - if anything - is necessary
in addition to these minimum requirements. The meaning of residence
7. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11 (1934). See also note 2 supra.
8. As is true, for example, of one who has both a country and a city dwell-

ing. See, e.g., In re Dorrance's Estate, 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 Atl. 601 (Prerog.

Ct. 1934); In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 Atl. 303 (1932).
9. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 30-39 (1934).
10. Id. § 40.
11. 1 RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 151-52 (1945).

12. Of course, the determination of a person's domicil may involve a difficult question of fact in situations where he has more or less divided his time
among two or more states. See, e.g., Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 59 Sup. Ct.
563, 83 L. Ed. 817 (1939). The term has also become enmeshed in many fine
distinctions and technicalities, in part it may be assumed because of the desire
of the courts to attain what was deemed to be a just result in the individual
case. See, e.g., McDonald v. Hartford Trust Co., 104 Conn. 169, 132 Atl. 902
(1926); Comment, 36 YALE L. J. 403 (1927).
13. "Residence, even in its restricted sense, means, therefore, more than
mere lodging or boarding or temporary occupation." Dwyer v. Matson, 163
F.2d 299, 302-03 (10th Cir. 1947). To the same effect, see, e.g., Barney v.
Oelrichs, 138 U.S. 529, 532, 11 Sup. Ct. 414, 34 L. Ed. 1037 (1891); In re Garneau,
127 Fed. 677 (7th Cir. 1904); D'Elia & Marks Co. v. Lyon, 31 A.2d 647, 648
(D.C. App. 1943); Strauss v. Smyth, 326 Ill. App. 687, 63 N.E.2d 271 (1945).
14. See, e.g., McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 71 Sup. Ct. 224, 95 L. Ed.
173 (1950); United States v. Stabler, 169 F.2d 995 (3d Cir. 1948); Neuberger

v. United States, 13 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1926); United Service Automobile Ass'n
v. Harman, 151 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
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varies from state to state with respect to the same type of statute; 15
in a single state it depends upon the particular statute under consider6
ation.'
The lay meaning of residence is equally vague and of little help in
statutory interpretation. In this sense, residence certainly arises after
one has lived in a place for a reasonably long time; it may also arise
after a comparatively short stay, or even immediately upon arrival,
provided that one intends to remain there for a considerable period in
the future. One thing at least is certain. In the lay sense, a man has
a residence in every place where he has a fixed place of abode. Therefore, it is perfectly possible to have two or more residences. Similarly,
a man who has no home and who travels constantly from place to
place may accurately be said to have no residence at all.
Residence, when used in a statute, places upon the courts a difficult
task of interpretation. 17 In the majority of cases, it has been construed
as being synonymous with domicil,' 8 but this has not always been the
case. On occasions it is a place where the individual has a fixed place
of abode, or where he has settled down to live for a period of time,
without reference to domiciliary intent. 19 Sometimes, however, it
means something more than domicil, namely, domicil plus physical
presence.20 Instances where residence is ordinarily interpreted as
bearing each of these three meanings will be discussed below. In view
of the multitude of statutes involved, mention will be made only of
those believed to be most typical. No attempt will be made to examine
the meaning of a statutory reference to residence as applied to corpora15. See, e.g., cases interpreting statutes dealing with venue, notes 53-55
infra; with settlement, notes 65-66 infra; and with school privileges, notes
90-93 infra.
16. That the courts attribute varying meanings to residence in different
statutory contexts will become apparent in the ensuing discussion. An excellent
example is In re Seidel, 204 Minn. 357, 283 N.W. 742 (1939). There, the court
held that the word had a different meaning in the old age assistance law than
in the poor relief law because the "differences in purpose and context of the
respective laws compel the inference that the legislature intended that the
relation of applicants to the county be of a more permanent character for
eligibility under the old age assistance law than under the poor relief law. The
poor relief law was designed to protect human beings from extreme hardships.
It is essentially an emergency measure ....

Under such circumstances the

domiciliary intent of an applicant is of negligible significance. The purpose
of the old age assistance act is of a different nature. Such assistance is, in one
sense, a reward bestowed by the community on its aged members for past

[T]he term 'resided' as used in this act was
services and good citizenship ....
Id.
intended to include the element of intent and the status of domicile ..

at 361.
17. See note 4 supra.

18. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws
CONFLICT OF LAws 19 (2d ed. 1951).

§ 9, Comment e (1934);

STUMBERG,

See notes 47-75 infra. One writer has
collected one hundred decisions of American courts which hold definitely that
residence and domicil are synonymous, and offset against them an equal number of decisions to the effect that they are not synonymous. KENNAN, RESIDENCE AND DOMICILE 22 (1934).
19. See notes 76-102 infra.
20. See notes 22-42 infra.

"RESIDENCE"
tions. This question raises peculiar considerations, and is a subject
21
in itself.
RESIDENCE AS MEANING

SOMETHING MORE

THAN DomICIL

Statutes dealing with divorce jurisdiction are an excellent example.
They ordinarily provide that in order to secure a divorce the plaintiff
must have been a "resident" of the state for a prescribed period of
22
time. Here residence is at least the equivalent of domicil. Indeed, according to present notions, one of the parties must be domiciled in the
23
state before the court can have jurisdiction to grant such relief.
Actually, in this context, residence often means something more than
domicil. Let us suppose, for example, that the state in question is
Florida which has a ninety days' residence requirement. 24 Suppose
further that the plaintiff arrives in Florida on a certain day with the
definite intention to make that state his home. At the very moment
of his arrival, he has, under the ordinary rules, acquired a domicil in
Florida.2 But that is not enough to give the Florida courts jurisdiction
to award him a divorce, for he has not yet satisfied the ninety days'
residence requirement. Also, under the ordinary rules, a domicil is not
lost by mere physical absence from the state.26 So if, on the day after
his arrival, our plaintiff were to leave Florida on a three-month business trip, he would not lose thereby his domicil. And, upon his return
at the end of that period, he would have been a domiciliary of the state
for a period of ninety days. But still he would not be able to get his
divorce because of his failure to satisfy the residence requirement.
What is demanded by many such statutes, in other words, is not only
domicil at the time of the commencement of the suit but also physical
21. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 41 (1934); 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 228-43 (1935); Coox, LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
207 (1942); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS 60-66 (2d ed. 1949); Francis, The Domicil of

a Corporation38 YALE L.J. 335 (1929).

22. See, e.g., Stewart v. Stewart, 185 F.2d 436 (D.C. App. 1930); Anderson
v. Anderson, 38 Hawaii 261 (1948); Snyder v. Snyder, 240 Iowa 239, 35 N.W.2d

32 (1948); Lynch v. Lynch, 210 Miss. 810, 50 So.2d 378 (1951); Wray v. Wray,
149 Neb. 376, 31 N.W.2d 228 (1948); Schwallbach v. Schwallbach, 84 N.Y.S.2d
345 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 276 App. Div. 825, 93 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1st Dep't 1949).
Cases prior to 1945, including some few cases holding residence to mean something less than domicil, are collected in Note, 106 A.L.R. 6 (1935), supplemented

by Note, 159 A.L.R. 496 (1945).
23. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 63 Sup. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279
(1942); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 111 (1934). But cf. Cook v. Cook,
342 U.S. 126, 72 Sup. Ct. 157, 96 L. Ed. 146 (1951).
24. This statute reads as follows: "In order to obtain a divorce the complainant must have resided ninety days in the State of Florida before the
filing of the bill of complaint." FLA. STAT. § 65.02 (1949).
25. In the case put, the plaintiff has satisfied the requirements for the acquisition of a domicil of choice; namely, physical presence in the state, combined with the intention of making that state his home. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 15 (1934).
26. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 23 (1934).
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presence, except for temporary absences, during the required period of
27
time.
The residence requirement in the naturalization section of the
Nationality Act of 1940 requires not only technical domicil in this
country 29 to render an alien eligible for American citizenship, but
also something more. The statute provides that, subject to certain exceptions, the petitioner must have "resided continuously within the
United States for at least five years" immediately preceding the filing
of the petition, and "continuously" from the date of the petition to the
time of admission to citizenship.30
27. See, e.g., Spratt v. Spratt, 210 La. 370, 27 So.2d 154 (1946); Banfield v.
Banfield, 318 Mich. 38, 27 N.W.2d 336 (1947); Wray v. Wray, 149 Neb. 376, 31
N.W.2d 228 (1948); Chidester v. Chidester, 163 Pa. Super. 194, 60 A.2d 574
(1948); Ivy v. Ivy, 177 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). The cases are collected in Note, 106 A.L.R. 6 (1937), supplemented by Note, 159 A.L.R. 496
(1945).
Nevada requires the plaintiff in a divorce action to have been "actually,
physically and corporeally present" for the whole of the statutory period of
residence. Lewis v. Lewis, 50 Nev. 419, 264 Pac. 981 (1928). Even here, a
short absence is permissible provided the aggregate time of physical presence
meets the statutory minimum. Lamb v. Lamb, 57 Nev. 421, 65 P.2d 872 (1937).
States with longer residence requirements are less strict regarding temporary
absences. Cf. Hiles v. Hiles, 164 Va. 131, 178 S.E. 913, 106 A.L.R. 1 (1935).
Indeed, some of these states require only technical domicil and will grant a
divorce even though the plaintiff has been physically absent from the jurisdiction for almost the entire statutory period. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams,
191 Ga. 437, 12 S.E.2d 352 (1940) (1 year requirement); McWilliams v. McWilliams, 206 La. 1007, 20 So.2d 295 (1944) (2 years): Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 166
S.W.2d 805 (Mo. App. 1942) (1 year); Bell v. Bell, 135 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939) (1 year).
As to the application of the residence requirement to servicemen, see Note,
21 A.L.R.2d 1163 (1952).
28. 54 STAT. 1142 (1940), 8 U.S.C.A. § 707 (1942).
29. It has been held that residence as used in this statute means at least
domicil. Petition of Correa, 79 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Tex. 1948); Petition of
Wong Choon Hoi, 71 F. Supp. 160 (S.D. Cal. 1947), appeal dismissed, 164 F.2d
696 (9th Cir. 1947); Petition of Wright, 42 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Mich. 1941);
Petition of Oganesoff, 20 F.2d 978 (S.D. Cal. 1927).
30. The statute provides that continuous absence for more than six months
during the critical periods renders the alien ineligible, except in the case of:
(a) an absence of less than one year, if for "reasonable cause," and (b) an
absence of more than one year, if the alien, after residing in the United States
for at least one year during which time he has made a declaration of intent to
become a citizen, is employed by the United States Government or by an
American research institute or business firm, has received permission from
the Attorney-General to go abroad, and can prove to the naturalization court
his absence was for such reason. 54 STAT. 1142 (1940), 8 U.S.C.A. § 707
that
(1947).
Thus an actual absence from the United States for a year or more during
the five years preceding filing of the petition for naturalization is an absolute
bar to the granting of the petition unless one of the statutory exceptions is
proved. United States v. Larson, 155 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1947). And see United
States v. Menichelli, 65 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Pa. 1946); Petition of Rothschild,
57 F. Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
The purpose of this requirement of physical presence has been said to be
two-fold: to expose the alien to American institutions, and to permit the
naturalization service to observe him. Application of Viloria, 84 F. Supp. 584
(D. Hawaii 1949); In re Vasicek, 271 Fed. 326 (E.D. Mo. 1921); In re Di Giovine,
242 Fed. 741 (W.D.N.Y. 1917).
The predecessor of the present law, the Nationality Act of 1906, which, in
general terms, required five years' residence within the United States to render
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The term residence as used in state homestead exemption laws would
frequently seem to mean something more than technical domicil,
namely, actual occupancy of the premises and the use thereof as the
sole or principal family home. 31 Generally, day-to-day presence is not
insisted upon, and temporary absences for business or convenience do
not result in loss of the exemption.3 2 On the other hand, absence for
a prolonged period despite intent or preparation to return, is considered
an abandonment of the homestead.3 Statutes dealing with other exemptions from the claims of creditors granted by a state to its residents,
are customarily interpreted as applying to all domiciliaries.34 Some
an alien eligible for naturalization, was interpreted to use the word residence
as meaning something more than domicil, although not as requiring the applicant to be physically present in this country during the entire length of
the period. United States v. Griminger, 236 Fed. 285 (N.D. Ohio 1916). Accord:
In re Schradieck, 29 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1928); United States v. Mulvey, 232 Fed.
513 (2d Cir. 1916); United States v. Cantini, 212 Fed. 925 (3d Cir. 1914); Matter
of Schneider, 19 F.2d 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1927).
For different interpretations ot residence in other sections of the Act, see
United States v. Stabler, 169 F. 2d 995 (3d Cir. 1948); Toy Teung Kwong v.
Acheson, 97 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1951); Wong Gan Chee v. Acheson, 95 F.
Supp. 817 (N.D. Cal. 1951); In re Fleischman, 49 F. Supp. 223 (W.D.N.Y. 1943).
31. Turnbeaugh v. Santos, 146 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1944) (California statute);
Skinner v. Hall, 69 Cal. 195, 10 Pac. 406 (1886); Rix v. McHenry, 7 Cal. 89
(1857); Quehl v. Peterson, 47 Minn. 13, 49 N.W. 390 (1891); Bank of Hattiesburg v. Mollere, 118 Miss. 154, 79 So. 87 (1918); Meyer Bros. Drug Co. v.
Fly, 105 Miss. 752, 63 So. 227 (1913); Moore v. Bradford, 70 Miss. 70, 11 So. 630
(1892); Thompson, Lampkin & Co. v. Tillotson, 56 Miss. 36 (1878); Thomas v.
Thoms, 45 Miss. 263 (1871); Fulton v. Roberts, 113 N.C. 421, 18 S.E. 510 (1893);
Ex parte Morrow, 183 S.C. 170, 190 S.E. 506 (1937); Trimmier v. Winsmith,
41 S.C. 109, 19 S.E. 283 (1894).
It has been held that a wife living in Italy had no homestead interest in
Michigan realty deeded by her husband, notwithstanding that she intended to
join him in Michigan as soon as the immigration law made it possible, and,
under ordinary conflict of laws rules, was a domiciliary of Michigan. Leonetti
v. Tolton, 265 Mich. 618, 250 N.W. 512 (1933). Accord: Duda v. Beben, 252
Wis. 295, 31 N.W.2d 603 (1948) (wife in Poland under similar circumstances);
cf. Engen v. Union State Bank, 121 Neb. 257, 236 N.W. 741 (1931) (where
the wife, in Norway, had no intention of joining her husband in this country,
it was held that "under the circumstances, her residence did not follow that of
her husband.").
In one case it was stated that the location of the homesteader's domicil elsewhere is irrelevant so long as there is "permanent residence in the state [of
Florida] . . . coupled with the ownership of property which is adapted to be
and is used as a family home." Croker v. Croker, 51 F.2d 11, 12-13 (5th Cir.
1931).
32. Gray v. Patterson, 65 Ark. 373, 46 S.W. 730 (1898); Fulton v. Roberts, 113
N.C. 421, 18 S.E. 510 (1893); Nelson v. Griggs County, 56 N.D. 729, 219 N.W.
225 (1928).
The renting of the house for the tourist season was considered such a "temporary absence" in Collins v. Collins, 150 Fla. 374, 7 So.2d 443 (1942).
33. Quehl v. Peterson, 47 Minn. 13, 49 N.W. 390 (1891); Moore v. Bradford,
70 Miss. 70, 11 So. 630 (1892). But cf. Smith v. Spatford, 16 N.D. 208, 112 N.W.
965, 967 (1907), where it is stated that "The duration or length of time of the
absence is not of controlling weight.... An absence for years, with continuous
intention of returning to it gives creditors no right to the land." Residence
under the North Dakota statute is thus probably equivalent to domicil. See
also Matthews v. Matthews, 249 Ala. 611, 32 So.2d 514 (1947), holding that
where the prerequisite to a widow's right to the homestead exemption is a
residence in the state of her husband at the time of his death, residence as so
used means domicil.
34. Union Nat. Bank of Muncie v. Finley, 180 Ind. 470, 103 N.E. 110 (1913);
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courts however have held that, as with homestead exemptions, domicil
35
alone is not enough to bring one within the protection of these laws.
Residence as used in the federal statute providing for acquisition
of homesteads or public land 36 requires not only domici37 but also,
with some exceptions, continuous physical occupancy of the land in
38
question by the claimant for the statutory period of three years.
Residence has been held to mean more than domicil when used in
rules concerning admission to a state bar,39 and, in at least one case,
when employed in a corporation's by-laws. 40 Also, as will be discussed
later, a few courts interpret residence in statutes defining eligibility
to vote 4' or to hold office 42 as requiring more than domicil.
It should be noted that even where residence is construed to be
equivalent to domicil, 43 the statutes themselves often include as an
additional requirement that this residence (domicil) shall have been
maintained for a prescribed period of time.44 While in the situations
discussed above such a stipulation is ordinarily interpreted as requiring something more than domicil, namely, actual physical presence
within the state for at least most of that period, 45 similar provisions
in other types of statutes are almost invariably held to require only
that the technical domicil shall have continued46 for the statutory
period, physical absence alone being immaterial.
Union County Investment Co. v. Messix, 152 Iowa 412, 132 N.W. 823 (1911);
Cox v. Allen, 91 Iowa 462, 59 N.W. 335 (1894); Grimestead v. Lofgren, 105
Minn. 286, 117 N.W. 515 (1908); Chesney v. Francisco, 12 Neb. 626, 12 N.W.
94 (1882); Brown v. Beckwith, 58 W. Va. 140, 51 S.E. 977 (1905).
35. Cromer v. Self, 149 N.C. 164, 62 S.E. 885 (1908); Munds v. Cassidey, 98
N.C. 558, 4 S.E. 355 (1887).
36. 37 STAT. 123 (1912), 43 U.S.C.A. § 164 (1928).
37. Small v. Rakestraw, 196 U.S. 403 25 Sup. Ct. 285, 49 L. Ed. 527 (1905);
Whaley v. Northern Pac. Ry., 167 Fed. 664 (C.C.D. Mont. 1908); United States
v. Richards, 149 Fed. 443 (D. Neb. 1906).
38. Johnson v. United States, 51 F.2d 54 (10th Cir. 1931); United States v.
Peterson, 34 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1929); United States v. Searson, 298 Fed. 928
(8th Cir. 1924). Under appropriate conditions, this requirement can be relaxed.
United States v. Bucher, 15 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1926).
39. Residence as required for admission to the bar includes not only domicil
in the state, In re De Benedetto, 196 Ind. 323, 148 N.E. 413 (1925) ; In re Pierce,
189 Wis. 441, 207 N.W. 966 (1926); In re Mosness, 39 Wis. 509, 20 Am. St. Rep.
55 (1876); but also, in at least one jurisdiction, actual physical presence for a
required period as well. Matter of Scharf, 279 App. Div. 919, (2d Dep't
1952); Re Horowitz, 276 App. Div. 918, 94 N.Y.S.2d 490 (2d Dep't 1950); Re
McGrath, 243 App. Div. 803, 278 N.Y. Supp. 135 (2d Dep't 1935).
40. Middle Tennessee Electric Membership Corp. v. State, 246 S.W.2d 958
(Tenn. 1952). The court found that the provision in the by-laws that a trustee
of the organization be a "bona fide resident in the area served by the cooperative" required not only domicil in the area but also the maintenance
there of the trustee's sole or principal place of abode.
41. See cases cited note 61 infra.
42. See cases cited note 63 infra.
43. See notes 47-75 infra.
44. See note 4 supra.
45. See notes 24-42 supra.
46. See, e.g., cases interpreting election qualification statutes, note 61 infra,
and welfare laws, note 65 infra.
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"RESIDENCE"
RESIDENCE AS BEING SYNoNYmOus wiTH DoMICIL

The bulk of the statutes fall within this area. Some of the more
typical are briefly noted below:
JudicialJurisdiction
Domicil constitutes an accepted basis for the exercise of in personam
jurisdiction over an absent defendant, 47 while residence, in the sense
of meaning something less than domicil, has not been recognized by
the Supreme Court as such. 48 Hence, it is hardly surprising that the
many statutes, providing for substituted service upon "residents"
absent from the state, have almost invariably been interpreted as requiring that the absent defendant be domiciled within the state.49 That
is to say, the existence of a fixed place of abode, unaccompanied by the
technical element of domicil, is generally thought not enough. 50 On
the other hand, domicil alone has been held sufficient to support substituted service. 51 The statutes, however, often require that process
be served at the defendant's "usual place of abode," and some courts
have construed this phrase to mean that substituted service cannot
be made upon an absent domiciliary unless he maintained a fixed
52place of abode within the state.
47. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 61 Sup. Ct. 339, 85 L. Ed. 278 (1940,
§ 79 (1934).

RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS

48. Under the British rules, however, residence does afford a basis for the
exercise of in personam jurisdiction.
Order XI, rule 1 (c), of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Judicature, in
England, reads as follows:
"1. Service out of the jurisdiction of a writ of summons or notice of a writ
of summons may be allowed by the Court or a Judge whenever
"... (c) Any relief is sought against any person domiciled or ordinarily
resident within the jurisdiction.... ." See Note, 48 COL. L. REV. 605, 608 (1948).
49. Schlawig v. DePeyster, 83 Iowa 323, 49 N.W. 843 (1891); Arnette v.
Arnette, 162 Kan. 677, 178 P.2d 1019 (1947); Mudge v. Mudge, 111 Neb. 403,
196 N.W. 706 (1923); Wood v. Roeder, 45 Neb. 311, 63 N.W. 853 (1895); McCandless v. Reuter, 248 App. Div. 93, 288 N.Y. Supp. 952 (1st Dep't 1936);
Hislop v. Taaffe, 141 App. Div. 40, 125 N.Y. Supp. 614 (2d Dep't 1910); cf.
Husband v. Crockett, 195 Ark. 1031, 115 S.W.2d 882 (1938).
50. Schlawig v. DePeyster; Arnette v. Arnette; Hislop v. Taaffe, all cited note
49 supra.
A few cases, however, have held that maintenance of a fixed place of abode
was sufficient to subject the absent defendant to substituted service, despite his
domicil in another state. See State ex rel. Merritt v. Heffernan, 142 Fla. 496,
195 So. 145 (1940); Camden Safe-Deposit & Trust Co. v. Barbour, 66 N.J.L. 103,
48 Atl. 1008 (1901); Harrison v. Farrington, 35 N.J. Eq. 4 (1882). Cf. Rawstorne v. Maguire, 265 N.Y. 204, 192 N.E. 294 (1934); and see Dorus v. Lyon,
92 Conn. 55, 101 Atl. 490 (1917).
"There may be good reason for extending the rule to persons resident [although not technically domiciled] in a state, at least where the residence is of
more than a mere transient nature. However, it is clear that the law has not
yet developed this far." GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 193, n.101 (3d ed. 1949).
51. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 Sup. Ct. 339 85 L. Ed. 278 (1940);
Rovinski v. Rowe, 131 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1942); McFadden v. Shore, 60 F.Supp.
8 (E.D.Pa. 1945); Skidmore v. Greene, 33 F.Supp. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Ruth &
Clark, Inc. v. Emery, 243 Iowa 1234, 11 N.W.2d 397 (1943).
52. Kurilla v. Roth, 132 N.J.L. 213, 38 A.2d 862 (1944); Feighan v. Sobers,
84 N.J.L. 575, 87 Atl. 636 (1913); (but cf. other New Jersey cases cited note 50
supra,indicating that domicil is not a requirement for jurisdiction so long as a
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Residence has also been held synonymous with domicil in the majority of cases construing statutes which deal with venue, or, more
explicitly, with the particular county or district within which suit
may be brought. 3 Since, however, rules relating to venue are concerned with the convenience of the parties rather than with jurisdiction,5 4 it may be that a fixed place of abode or protracted physical
presence, unaccompanied by technical domicil, should satisfy the
statute, and a number of cases have so held.5 5
In other contexts, statutes that accord jurisdiction to the courts on
the basis of residence are frequently treated as referring to domicil.
So it is, for example, with those that provide for the probate of a will56
and for the appointment of an administrator 7 at the residence of the
fixed place of abode exists within the state); Lerman v. Copperman, 183 Misc.
352, 52 N.Y.S.2d 50 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Thompson v. Mundheim, 180 Misc. 1002, 43
N.Y.S.2d 632 (Sup. Ct. 1943), affd, 266 App. Div. 1001, 45 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1st
Dep't 1943); Robinson v. Robinson, 362 Pa. 554, 67 A.2d 273 (1949). Cf. Compton v. Hulse, 10 N.J. Misc. 486, 159 Atl. 806 (1932).
It has been suggested that "in a statute which provides that process may be
served upon an absent defendant by notice at his residence, the word must
necessarily be interpreted as meaning 'domicil which is an actual dwelling
place' if the process is to be valid in another state. .. " 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF
LAws 114 (1935).

53. Ex parte Stroud, 248 Ala. 480, 28 So.2d 316 (1946); Younger v. Spreckels,
12 Cal. App. 175, 106 Pac. 895 (1909); Robbins v. McAlister, 91 Colo. 505, 16 P.2d
431 (1932); Barrow v. Barrow, 160 La. 91, 106 So. 705 (1925); Harrison v.
Harrison, 117 Md. 607, 84 Atl. 57 (1912); Pespecky v. Forman, 7 N.J. Misc.
518, 146 Atl. 317 (1929); Hislop v. Taaffe, 141 App. Div. 40, 125 N.Y. Supp.
614 (2d Dep't 1910); Washington v. Thomas, 103 App. Div. 423, 92 N.Y. Supp.
994 (1st Dep't 1905); (but cf. other New York cases cited note 55 infra);
Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 163 Pa. Super. 138, 60 A.2d 350 (1948); Brown v.
Brown, 150 Tenn. 89, 261 S.W. 959 (1924); Houston Printing Co. v. Tennant,
120 Tex. 539, 39 S.W.2d 1089 (1931). The cases are collected in Note, 12 A.L.R.2d
757 (1950). See also KENNAN, RESIDENCE AND DOMICILE c.27 (1934).
54. See Paige v. Sinclair, 237 Mass. 482, 130 N.E. 177 (1921) ; Beale, Residence
and Domicil 4 IowA L. BuLL. 3, 7 (1918).
55. United States v. Stabler, 169 F.2d 995 (3d Cir. 1948); Norton v. Purkins,
203 Ark. 586, 157 S.W.2d 765 (1942) [but cf. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 193
Ark. 207, 99 S.W.2d 571 (1936) ]; Cohen v. Daniels, 25 Iowa 88 (1868) [but cf.
Church v. Crossman, 49 Iowa 444 (1878)]; Howard v. Queen City Coach Co.,
212 N.C. 201, 193 S.E. 138 (1937); Generous v. Generous, 197 Misc. 651, 99
N.Y.S.2d 416 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Lawson v. Lawson, 64 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup. Ct.
1946); Bischoff v. Bischoff, 88 App. Div. 126, 85 N.Y. Supp. 81 (2d Dep't 1903)
[but cf. other New York cases cited note 53 supra]; Doyle v. Roy, 54 R.I. 98, 170
Ati. 91 (1934); Roof v. Tiller, 195 S.C. 132, 10 S.E.2d 333 (1940). Even under
this interpretation, however, residence must consist of more than a "mere
temporary sojourn." Kollman v. McGregor, 240 Iowa 1331, 39 N.W.2d 302
(1948).
56. Ford v. Peck, 116 Kan. 74, 225 Pac. 1054 (1924); Johnson v. Harvey, 261
Ky. 522, 88 S.W.2d 42, (1935); Robinson v. Paxton, 210 Ky. 575, 276 S.W. 500
(1925); In re Daggett's Will, 255 N.Y. 243, 174 N.E. 641 (1931); Kennedy v.
Ryall, 67 N.Y. 379 (1876); In re Strobel's Estate, 109 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Surr. Ct.
1951); In re Sawyer's Will, 190 Misc. 659, 78 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Surr. Ct. 1947);
In re Davis' Estate, 171 Okla. 575, 43 P.2d 115 (1935); In re Winsor's Estate, 264
Pa. 552, 107 Atl. 888 (1919). The Ohio statute dealing with jurisdiction to
probate a will expressly uses the word "domicile." Omo GEN. CODE ANN. §

10504-15 (Supp. 1951).
57. Lee v. Green, 73 A.2d 889 (Md. 1950); Shenton v. Abbott, 178 Md. 526, 15
A.2d 906 (1940); Whiting v. Shipley, 127 Md. 117, 96 Atl. 285 (1915); In re
Webber's Will, 64 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Surr. Ct. 1946); In re Horth's Estate, 25
N.Y.S.2d 262 (Surr. Ct. 1941); In re McElroy's Estate, 26 ERE Co. L.J. 394 (Pa.
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deceased, for the appointment of a guardian at the residence of the
ward 58 and for the adoption of a minor child at the place of his residence.5 9 Somewhat afield, yet pertinent in the present connection, is.
the fact that the domicil of the adverse parties is a crucial factor in
determining whether they are "citizens of different states" within the
meaning of the constitutional provision which gives jurisdiction in
60
such cases to the federal courts.
Governmental Benefits and Burdens
Residence in a state, or a local subdivision thereof, is a normal
statutory requirement for eligibility to vote or to hold office. So far
as eligiblity to vote is concerned, the term is usually synonymous with
domicil, since in most states the right to vote is not lost by physical
absence from, or even the lack of a place of abode in, the state or
district in question, so long as a new domicil has not been acquired
anywhere else.61 The same is also generally true of eligibility to hold
Orph. Ct. 1944). But cf. State v. Brewer, 147 Ohio St. 386, 72 N.E.2d 84 (1947),
stating that, since the statutory provision for probating wills expressly uses the
word "domiciled" in this connection, residence in the section providing for
administration of the estate of an intestate must mean something else than
domicil.

58. In re Cameron's Estate, 158 Fla. 91, 28 So.2d 110 (1946); Sudler v.

Sudler, 121 Md. 46, 88 Ati. 26 (1913); In re Schley, 253 App. Div. 818, 1 N.Y.S.2d
306 (2d Dep't 1938); Owens v. Stovall, 64 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
But cf. Martin v. Gardiner, 240 Mass. 350, 134 N.E. 380 (1922), where the
statutory language "inhabitants or residents" was held applicable to minors
physically present within the state although domiciled elsewhere.
59. Hughes v. Industrial Comm'n, 69 Ariz. 193, 211 P.2d 463 (1949); Johnson v. Smith, 94 Ind.App. 619, 180 N.E. 188 (1932); Krakow v. Dep't of Public
Welfare, 326 Mass. 452, 95 N.E.2d 184 (1950); In re Adoption of, 22
N.J. Misc. 181, 37 A.2d 645 (Orph. Ct. 1944); Greene v. Willis, 47 R.I. 251, 132
Atl. 545, 47 R.I. 375, 133 Atl. 651 (1926); Cribbs v. Floyd, 188 S.C. 443, 199 S.E.
677 (1938).
Some courts interpret residence in this context as meaning something else
than domicil. In re Pratt, 219 Minn. 414, 18 N.W.2d 147 (1945); In re Campbell's
Guardianship, 216 Mini. 113, 11 N.W.2d 786 (1943); In re Duren, 355 Mo. 1222,
200 S.W.2d 343 (1947). Cf. In re Kowalke's Guardianship, 232 Minn. 292, 46
N.W.2d 275 (1950). But cf. Pelton v. Halverson, 240 Iowa 184, 35 N.W.2d 759
(1949), where the court held that it could determine the custody of children
"resident" in Iowa although their domicil followed that of their father, who
was in another state.
60. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2. See Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 34 Sup.
Ct. 442 86 L. Ed. 337 (1913); Messick v. Southern Pennsylvania Bus Co., 59
F. Supp. 799 (E.D. Pa. 1945), and cases cited therein.
61. See, e.g., Vanderpoel v. O'Hanlon, 53 Iowa 246, 5 N.W. 119 (1880); Everman v. Thomas, 303 Ky. 156, 197 S.W.2d 58 (1946); Warren v. Board of
Registration, 72 Mich. 398, 40 N.W. 553 (1888); Berry v. Wilcox, 44 Neb. 82, 62

N.W. 249 (1895); State v., Atti, 127 N.J.L. 39, 21 A.2d 603 (1941), aff'd, 128

N.J.L. 318, 25 A.2d 634 (1942); Breuckmann v. Frignoca, 9 N.J. Misc. 128, 152
Atl. 780 (1930); Application of Woolley, 108 N.Y.S.2d 165 (Sup. Ct. 1951);
Isaacson v. Heffernan, 64 N.Y.S. 2d 726 (Sup. Ct. 1946); In re Stabile, 348 Pa.
587, 36 A.2d 451 (1944); In re Opinion of the Justices, 65 R.I. 451, 16 A.2d 331
(1940); Seibold v. Wahl, 164 Wis. 82, 159 N.W. 546 (1916). It has been suggested that the reason residence normally is held synonymous with domicil in
these and other statutes relating to governmental benefits and burdens is
that the law contemplates that each person should have one, but only one,
government to which he bears such relationships. See Beale, Residence and
Domicil, 4 IowA L. BuLL. 3, 4-5 (1918).
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office,6 2 although here, too, at least one statute has been interpreted to
require something more than domicil, namely, domicil plus mainten63
ance of a fixed place of abode.
Eligibility for a veteran's bonus, which the states sometimes award
to those of their residents who have served in the armed forces, is
said to depend upon domicil in the state in question. 64 In the case of
poor laws and other welfare statutes, however, there is no such unanimity of result. These customarily provide that the municipality of
which a person is a resident must support him in case of need, or
furnish him with other benefits. Frequently the term is said to be the
equivalent of domicil, 65 but on occasions it is interpreted as meaning
something else, namely, the place where the person actually lives,
regardless of the location of his technical domicil. 66
The Illinois cases have required in addition to domicil the maintenance of
a fixed place of abode for the statutory period. Clark v. Quick, 377 Ill. 424, 36
N.E.2d 563 (1941); Park v. Hood, 374 Ill. 36, 27 N.E.2d 838 (1940); Pope v. Board
of Election Comm'rs, 370 Ill. 196, 18 N.E.2d 214 (1938). A similar result has

been reached in Louisiana. See, e.g., State v. Joyce, 123 La. 633, 49 So. 219
(1939).
A peculiar Texas statute defines residence for voting purposes as, in the
case of a single man, the place where he usually sleeps at night, and in the
case of a married man not permanently separated from his wife, the place
where his wife resides. TEX. ELECTION CODE Art. 5.08 (1952). This has been
interpreted, in the case of single men, to refer to bodily presence alone, without
any domiciliary intent; in the case of a married man, however, who is not
permanently separated from his wife, the statute is construed as referring to
the marital domicil rather than to the place where the wife actually maintains
her place of abode. Major v. Loy, 155 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
62. Jones v. State, 207 Miss. 208, 42 So.2d 123 (1949); Wilson v. Hoisington,
110 Mont. 20, 98 P.2d 369 (1940); Briggs v. Stanton, 150 Atl. 238 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1930); Wildermuth v. La Guardia, 180 Misc. 725, 44 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct.
1943); State v. Moodie, 65 N.D. 340, 258 N.W. 558 (1935); Kempster v. Milwaukee, 97 Wis. 343, 72 N.W. 743 (1897). Cf. Baker v. Conway, 214 Ala. 356,
103 So. 18 (1926).
63. Newman v. United States, 43 App.D.C. 53 (1915); see People v. Owers,
29 Colo. 535, 543, 69 Pac. 515, 518 (1902).
64. Hipchen v. Soldiers' Compensation Board, 144 Kan. 517, 61 P.2d 878
(1936); Stevens v. Fraser, 53 N.D. 228, 205 N.W. 622 (1925); Op. Att'y Gen.
(Mich.) June 27, 1947, No. 44; 1947 Op. Att'y Gen. (N.Y.) 292. The Kansas
statute now provides that residence shall be determined by the declaration
of the applicant at the time he entered service, as indicated in the official
records of the war and navy departments of the United States government.
See Richardson v. Soldiers' Compensation Board, 150 Kan. 343, 92 P.2d 114
(1939).
65. People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374 Ill. 557, 30 N.E.2d 46 (1940);
Inhabitants of Knox v. Inhabitants of Montville. 98 Me. 493, 57 Atl. 792 (1904);
Inhabitants of Whately v. Inhabitants of Hatfield, 196 Mass. 393, 82 N.E. 48
(1907); Inhabitants of Stoughton v. Cambridge, 165 Mass. 251, 43 N.E. 106
(1896); In re Quale, 213 Minn. 421. 7 N.W.2d 153 (1942); In re Seidel, 204 Minn.
357, 283 N.W. 742 (1939); Town of Barton v. Town of Albany, 108 Vt. 531, 189
Atl. 853 (1937); State v. Dodge, 56 Wis. 79, 13 N.W. 680 (1882). Under most
statutes, residence must have continued for a prescribed period of time before
one is eligible for these benefits. See statutes cited note 4 supra.
66. "[T]he word 'residence,' when poor relief is concerned, has reference
to the place where a person actually lives as distinguished from his domicile."
Adams County v. Burleigh County, 69 N.D. 780, 787, 291 N.W. 281, 285 (1940).
"[T] he person in question must have been an actual resident 'even though he
have a technical domicile elsewhere. . .

'"

Town of Winchester v. Town

of Burlington, 128 Conn. 185, 188, 21 A.2d 371, 373 (1941).

Accord: Town of
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Turning now to governmental burdens, residence when used in
statutes providing for estate and inheritance taxes, some personal
property taxes and other impositions of a personal nature, such as
poll taxes, is interpreted as being the equivalent of domicil. 67 The

early conscription laws requiring militia or other military duty of residents were interpreted as referring- only to domiciliaries. 68 More recently, however, statutes providing that residents are eligible for or
required to perform military service have been interpreted to include
all those who have some settled connection with the state or nation,
even though not domiciled there.69
Chaplin v. Town of Bloomfield, 92 Conn. 395, 103 Atl. 118 (1918); State v.
Peisen, 233 Iowa 865, 10 N.W.2d 645 (1943); North Yarmouth v. West Gardiner,
58 Me. 207 (1870); State v. Juvenile Court of Wadena County, 188 Minn. 125,
246 N.W. 544 (1933); Town of Smiley v. Village of St. Hilaire, 183 Minn. 533,
237 N.W. 416 (1931); Nelson County v. Williams County, 68 N.D. 56, 276 N.W.
265 (1937); City of Enderlin v. Pontiac Township, 62 N.D. 105, 242 N.W. 117
(1932).
However, continued and unbroken physical presence during the entire
statutory period is not required. Baldwin v. Tiffany, 250 N.Y. 489, 166 N.E.
177 (1929).
Some courts give different content to the word, when used in different types
of welfare statutes. See In re Seidel, 204 Minn. 357, 283 N.W. 742 (1939). Cf.
In re Newhouse, 233 Iowa 1007, 9 N.W.2d 372 (1943).
67. Personal property and poll taxes: Sweeney v. District of Columbia, 22
App. D.C. 30, 113 F.2d 25 (C.C.D.C. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 631 60 Sup. Ct.
1082, 84 L. Ed. 1401 (1940). On Yuehn Hai Co. v. Ross, 14 Fed. 338 (C.C.D.
Ore. 1882) (Chinese tax case); Barhydt v. Cross, 156 Iowa 271, 136 N.W. 525
(1912); Borland v. Boston, 132 Mass. 89 (1882); State v. Ross, 23 N.J.L. 517
(1852); Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 110 Va. 229, 65 S.E. 536 (1909).
Estate and inheritance taxes: Bowring v. Bowers, 24 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1928);
Commonwealth v. Harkness' Adm'r, 197 Ky. 198, 246 S.W. 803 (1923); Cromwell
v. Neeld, 15 N.J. Super. 296, 83 A.2d 337 (1951); In re Dorrance's Estate, 115
N.J. Eq. 268, 170 Ati. 601 (Prerog. Ct. 1934), aU'd, Dorrance v. Martin, 13 N.J.
Misc. 168, 176 Atl. 902 (Sup. Ct. 1935), affd, 116 N.J.L. 362, 184 Atl. 743 (1936);
In re Daly's Estate, 178 Misc. 943, 36 N.Y.S.2d 954 (Surr. Ct. 1942); In re Lyon's
Estate. 117 Misc. 189, 191 N.Y. Supp. 260 (Surr. Ct. 1921), aff'd, 200 App. Div.
918, 192 N.Y. Supp. 936 (2d Dep't 1922); In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163
Atl. 303 (1932); State Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Commonwealth, 174 Va.
289, 6 S.E.2d 629 (1940).
According to present Supreme Court decisions, only the state of a decedent's
domicil can impose an inheritance tax upon all of his intangibles wherever
situated. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 59 Sup. Ct. 563 83 L. Ed. 817 (1939);
Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 58 Sup. Ct. 185, 82 L. Ed.
268 (1937).
Residence in income tax statutes, however, is generally interpreted as meaning something other than domicil. See notes 76-82 infra. See generally GoODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS c. 3 (3d ed. 1949); KENNAN, RESIDENCE AND DOMICIL

c. 23, 24 (1934).
68. Commonwealth v. Swan, 18 Mass. 194 (1822); Shattuck v. Maynard, 3
N.H. 123 (1824); Ex parte Blumer, 27 Tex. 734 (1865).
69. United States v. Rubenstein, 166 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1948) (Selective
Training and Service Act of 1940); Owens v. Huntling, 115 F.2d 160 (9th Cir.
1940) (Oregon statute determining eligibility for National Guard service). The
Supreme Court has pointed out, however, that "residence involves some choice,
again like domicile, and that presence elsewhere through constraint has no
effect upon it"; and on this ground the Court held that an alien present in this
country on a temporary visit but prevented by the outbreak of World War II
from returning to his homeland was not liable for military duty as a resident
of the United States within the meaning of the Selective Service law. McGrath
v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162 71 Sup. Ct. 224, 95 L. Ed. 173 (1950).
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Miscellaneous

Under normal conflict of laws rules, matters relating to the distribution of personal property upon death are governed by the law of the
decedent's last domicil.7 0 For this reason, a state statute which provided that the personal property of a decedent should be distributed
according to the law of the country or state of his residence7 ' was
interpreted as referring to the decedent's domicil at the time of
death.7 2 There is some dispute as to the meaning of residence when
used in statutes which toll the statutory period of limitation during
such time as the defendant is absent from and resides outside of the
state. The obvious purpose of these enactments is to stop the running
of the statute during such periods of time as the defendant cannot be
subjected to the personal jurisdiction of the court. Since, as has already been seen,7 3 domiciliaries can always be reached by suit, there
would appear to be no justification for considering them nonresidents
within the meaning of these statutes, irrespective of their actual place
of abode. This is the result reached by what is probably the majority
of decisions,7 4 although some regard any reasonably protracted absence
from the state, unaccompanied by a change of domicil, as sufficient
75
to bring the statute into play.

70. Schultz v. Chicago City Bank & Trust Co., 384 Ill. 148, 51 N.E.2d 140

(1943); White v. Tennant, 31 W. Va. 790, 8 S.E. 596 (1888);

FLICT OF LAWS §§ 300-10 (1934).
71. MO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 253 (1939).

RESTATEMENT, CON-

72. Locke v. McPherson, 103 Mo. 493, 63 S.W. 726 (1901). Another statute
525.272
expressly uses the word "domicil" in this context. MINN. STAT.
(Henderson 1949). The Mississippi statute, on the other hand, provides that

all personal property within the state shall be distributed according to Mississippi law, notwithstanding that the domicil of the decedent may have
been in another state. Miss. CODE ANN. § 467 (1942).
An Ohio statute permitting courts of that state to set off a year's allowance
to the widow and children of a "non-resident decedent" who leaves property
in Ohio, when the "state of decedent's residence" fails to make such provision, was held to use the word resident as equivalent to domiciliary, and
thus applicable to a widow dwelling in Ohio but domiciled elsewhere. In re
McCombs' Estate, 52 Ohio L.R. 353, 80 N.E.2d 573 (1948). The Illinois statute
providing for an award out of a decedent's estate to his widow if "residing
in this state" was held to apply to a widow whose husband had died a domiciliary of the state, though she herself had never entered Illinois. In re Estate
of Quinn, 283 Ill. App. 597 (1936). Similarly, residence was held to mean
domicil in the Illinois statute authorizing an allowance to resident children
from the estate of a parent who died without leaving a surviving spouse. In re
Gilbert's Estate, 311 Ill. App. 28, 35 N.E.2d 400 (1941).
73. See note 47 supra.
74. Connolly v. Serunian, 138 Me. 80, 21 A.2d 830 (1941); Hallet v. Bassett,
100 Mass. 167 (1868); Langdon v. Doud, 88 Mass. 423 (18635; State v. Snyder,
182 Mo. 462, 82 S.W. 12 (1904) (criminal statute); Venuci v. Cademartori, 59
Mo. 352 (1875); People v. Gauriglia, 187 Misc. 843, 65 N.Y.S.2d 96 (Co. Ct.
1946) (criminal statute); Trask v. Karrick, 94 Vt. 70, 108 Atl. 846 (1920);
Dignam v Shaff, 51 Wash. 412, 98 Pac. 1113 (1909).
For similar reasons, the majority of courts hold that the absence of a nonresident motorist from the state does not toll the statute of limitations when
provision is made by statute for substituted service of process on a state
official. See Kokenge v. Holthaus, 52 N.W.2d 711 (Iowa 1952), and cases cited
therein.
75. Connor v. Timothy, 43 Ariz. 517, 33 P.2d 293 (1934); Strauss v. Smyth,
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RESIDENCE AS MEANING SOMETHING OTHER THAN

DoMIcm

As used in the statutes discussed below, residence does not bear
the same meaning as domicil. It does, on the other hand, require a
well-settled physical connection with the community in question,
ordinarily including the maintenance there of a fixed place of abode.
In these contexts, residence closely approaches its lay meaning. Domicil
is not determinative; one may be a resident of a place where he is not
domiciled, and, conversely, is not necessarily a resident of the place
of his domicil. Thus, one may have a single residence (not necessarily
at the place of one's domicil), a number of residences, or, lacking the
requisite physical relationship with any particular place, no residence
at all.
Probably, the most significant statutes that fall within this area
are those dealing with income taxation, attachment, constructive
service on nonresident motorists, school privileges and the recording
of chattel mortgages and conditional sales.
Most state income tax statutes make it explicit on their face that
they use residence in a sense other than domicil by providing that
within their meaning, the word resident includes those domiciled
in the state as well as those who maintain a "permanent place of
abode" within the state and, during the taxable year, stay there more
than a specified time, which normally is either six or seven months.7 6
A few statutes impose an income tax upon all residents without any
326 IM. App. 687, 63 N.E. 2d 271 (1945); Bennett v. Watson, 21 App. Div. 409,
47 N.Y. Supp. 569 (1st Dep't 1897); Hart v. Kip, 74 Hun. 412, 26 N.Y. Supp.
522 (Sup. Ct. 1893) ; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Sheahan, 37 Okla. 702, 133 Pac. 228
(1913) (construing Illinois statute); Fisher v. Phelps, Dodge & Co., 21 Tex. 551
(1858); Keith-O'Brien Co. v. Snyder, 51 Utah 227, 169 Pac. 954 (1917).
Mere temporary absence, however, has been held not to suspend the statute
of limitations. Barney v. Oelrichs, 138 U.S. 529, 11 Sup. Ct. 414, 34 L. Ed. 1037
(1891) (construing New York statute).
It has been held that the statute of limitations will continue to run in the
defendant's favor despite domicil elsewhere, so long as he comes into the
state with reasonable regularity. Mack v. Mendels, 249 N.Y. 356, 164 N.E. 248
(1928). Huber v. Rebay, 60 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. N.Y. 1944). And cf. Dorus v.
Lyon, 92 Conn. 55, 101 Atl. 490 (1917). But mere transient visits to the state
will not prevent the tolling of the statute, despite temporary liability to service
of process while there. Farmers State Bank v. Jones, 232 S.W.2d 658, 34 Tenn.
App. 57 (E.S. 1949).
In one case it was held that the tolling provisions of a criminal statute operates even though the defendant is both domiciled in and physically present
within the state, if he is concealed or does not maintain a "fixed, permanent
and established home where his personal presence might reasonably be known."
Coleman v. Territory, 5 Okla. 201, 47 Pac. 1079 (1897).
76. See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 51, § 373 (1940); ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 84 §
2002(9) (1947); CALiF. REVENUE CODE § 17013 (1939); GA. CODE ANN. § 923002(i) (1937); IND. STAT. ANN. § 64-2602 (Baldwin Supp. 1951); LA. REV.
STAT. tit. 47, § 31 (1950); MD. ANN. CODE Art. 81 § 275(i) (Flack 1951); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 9221(e) (1942); N.Y. TAx LAw § 350(7) (1943); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 105-132(13) (1950); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-14-1(7) (1953); VA. CODE
ANN. § 58-77 (8) (1950); WIs. STAT. § 71.01(1) (1949). The Arizona statute
defines residence as meaning domicil, but states that anyone spending at least
nine months of the year in Arizona is deemed prima facie to be domiciled in
the state. ARiz. CODE ANN. § 73-1504(d) (1939).
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attempt to define the term.77 Some of these have been interpreted as
applying only to domiciliaries. 78 The federal income tax is imposed
upon the entire net income of every citizen of the United States and
of every resident, whether a citizen or not.79 The explanatory Treasury
Regulation makes it clear that residence is not here used in the sense of
domicil, since it provides that a resident alien is one who is not "a mere
transient or sojourner .... Whether he is a mere transient or not is
determined by his intentions with regard to the length and nature of
his stay.... [I]f his purpose is of such a nature that an extended stay
may be necessary for its accomplishment, and to that end the alien
makes his home temporarily in the United States, he becomes a
resident, though it be his intention at all times to return to his domicile
abroad when the purpose for which he came has been consummated
or abandoned." 0 A further provision excludes from the tax income
earned abroad by an American citizen "who establishes to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is a bona fide resident of a foreign
country or countries during the entire taxable year."81 Here again it
is clear that residence does not mean domicil, since the Treasury
Regulations provide that in general bona fide foreign residence shall
be determined by the principles laid down with respect to residence
82
by aliens in the United States.
State statutes frequently permit attachment of the property of
nonresident debtors at the commencement of suit. Their purpose is
to permit a plaintiff immediately to bring within his grasp the local
assets of a defendant against whom a judgment could not be enforced
in the ordinary way. 83 Thus, attachment is generally held to lie against
a defendant who, although domiciled in the state, is absent therefrom
for more than a temporary period. 84 Such a person is, of course, subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the state, and, for this reason,
a valid in personam judgment could be rendered against him there.8 5
77. MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 62, § 22 (1945); S.C. CODE ANN. § 2437 (1942). The
Massachusetts law uses the word "inhabitants."
78. Mitchell v. Delaware State Tax Comm'r, 3 Terry 589. 42 A.2d 19 (Del.
1945); Philips v. South Carolina Tax Comm'r, 195 S.C. 472. 12 S.E.2d 13 (1940).
79. INT. REV. CODE §§ 11, 12; U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.11 (1943). Special
provision is made for the taxation of nonresident aliens on income received
from sources within the United States. INT. REV. CODE § 211.
80. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.211 (1943).
81. INT. REV. CODE § 116(a).
82. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.116 (1944). Cf. Seely v. Comm'r, 186 F.2d 541
(2d Cir. 1951); Downs v. Comm'r, 166 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1948); Swenson v.
Thomas, 164 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1947); Kyle v. Jones, 92 F. Supp. 600 (W.D.

Okla. 1950). See Note, 51 COL. L. REV. 378 (1951).
83. See Beale, Residence and Domicil, 4 IowA L. BULL. 3, 9-10 (1918). For a
detailed examination of the interpretation given the word residence in this
context, see Notes 19 L.R.A. 665 (1893), and 26 A.L.R. 180 (1923).
84. See, e.g., Hanson v. Graham, 82 Cal. 631, 23 Pac. 56 (1890); Union Nat.
Bank v. Finley, 180 Ind. 470, 103 N.E. 110 (1913); Haggart v. Morgan, 5 N.Y.
422 (1851); Carden v. Carden, 107 N.C. 214, 12 S.E. 197 (1890); Raymond v.
Leishman, 243 Pa. 64, 89 Atl. 791 (1914).
85. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 61 Sup. Ct. 339, 85 L. Ed. 278 (1940).

"RESIDENCE"
This judgment, however, could not be enforced by poor debtor process
or arrest, as would be true in the case of resident debtors, but only
by levy of execution against local assets or by a further suit upon
the judgment in another state where the defendant either had property
or could be personally served with process. 86 Residence, therefore, as
the term is used in attachment statutes, does not normally mean domicil; it does, on the other hand, require a rather well-settled connection
with the state. Thus, the writ will not lie against one who, although
87
not a domiciliary of the state, maintains a fixed place of abode there.
It is available, however, against one who happens to be physically
88
present in the state on a temporary visit.

For similar reasons, some statutes providing for constructive service upon nonresident motorists involved in accidents within the state
have been applied to domiciliaries of the state whose actual places of
abode were elsewhere. 89
86. See Beale, supra note 83.
87. Jarrell v. Leeper, 178 Ark. 6, 9 S.W.2d 778 (1928); D'Elia & Marks Co.
v. Lyon, 31 A.2d 647 (D.C. App. 1943); Barron v. Burke, 82 Ill. App. 116 (1898);
Brown v. Crane, 69 Miss. 678, 13 So. 855 (1892); Clark v. Likens, 26 N.J.L. 207
(1857); Irwin v. Raymond, 58 Misc. 319, 110 N.Y. Supp. 1100 (Sup. Ct. 1908);
Rosenzweig v. Wood, 30 Misc. 297, 63 N.Y. Supp. 447, aff'd, 52 App. Div. 631, 65
N.Y. Supp. 1144 (1st Dep't 1900). Munroe v. Williams, 37 S.C. 81, 16 S.E. 533
(1892); Didier v. Patterson, 93 Va. 534, 25 S.E. 661 (1896); Andrews v. Mundy,
36 W. Va. 22, 14 S.E. 414 (1892).
The Louisiana statute, however, explicitly provides that the writ shall lie
against both nonresident defendants and those "not domiciled in this state."
Thus attachment was available against one whose settled place of abode was
in Louisiana, on the ground that his statements as to "legal residence" and his
payment of the Texas poll tax indicated that he had not abandoned his Texas
domicil. Clarke v. Patton, 16 So. 2d 585 (La. App. 1944).
88. Howard v. The Citizens' Bank and Trust Co., 12 App. D.C. 222 (1898);
Hickson v. Brown, 92 Ga. 225, 17 S.E. 1035 (1893); Jackson v. Perry, 52 Ky. 184,
13 B. Mon. 231 (1852); Augustus Co. v. Manzella, 19 N.J. Misc. 29, 17 A.2d 68
(1940). But cf. Loew's Inc. v. Dorsey, 197 Misc. 1069, 97 N.Y.S.2d 315 (Sup. Ct.
1950), holding that presence of defendant in the state for a brief period to
perform a musical engagement was sufficient to quash a writ of attachment.
89. Hughes v. Lucker, 233 Minn. 207, 46 N.W.2d 497 (1951); Chapman v.
Davis, 233 Minn. 62, 45 N.W.2d 822 (1951); Reed v. Lombardi, 181 Misc. 805,
44 N.Y.S.2d 382 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Uslan v. Woronoff, 173 Misc. 693, 18 N.Y.S.2d
222, aff'd, 259 App.Div. 1093, 21 N.Y.S.2d 613, rearg. denied, 259 App. Div. 1117,
22 N.Y.S.2d 464 (2d Dep't 1940). Conversely, one is not a nonresident within
the meaning of such a statute if he maintains his fixed place of abode within
the state, although he is domiciled elsewhere. Suit v. Shailer, 18 F. Supp. 568
(D. Md. 1937); Carlson v. District Court, 116 Colo. 330, 180 P.2d 525 (1947).
Some cases, however, have interpreted residence in this context as the
equivalent of domicil. Berger v. Superior Court, 79 Cal. App. 2d 425, 179 P.2d
600 (1947); Northwestern Mortgage and Security Co. v. Noel Construction Co.,
71 N.D. 256, 300 N.W.28 (1941).
But "regardless of whether the word resident is used as meaning domicile,
or in a more liberal sense," there must be volition in establishing the residence.
Therefore an unmarried serviceman stationed at a military base in a state is
not a "resident" thereof within such a statute unless it can be shown that he
intended to establish his residence there, at least for the time being. United
Service Automobile Ass'n v. Harman, 151 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
See generally, Note, 155 A.L.R. 333, 343 (1945).
Statutes permitting "non-residents" to operate motor vehicles on a state's
highways without registering them are usually held not applicable to those
present in the state for more than a temporary sojourn, even though they main-
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Statutes dealing with school privileges are often interpreted as using
residence in a sense other than domicil. Such statutes commonly
provide that school districts must give free education to children who
reside within their territbry, but can charge a fee to those who live
elsewhere. A large number of decisions hold that residence, when
used in this connection, requires only that the child be physically
present in the school district for a reasonably lengthy period of time. 90
Under this view, a child who lives with a relative or guardian is entitled to free education in the district of the latter's residence, 91 although, of course, his actual domicil will normally be the same as that
of his father. 92 On the other hand, a considerable body of authority
takes the position that residence in the context of such statutes is syn93
onymous with domicil.
Statutes providing for the recording of conditional sales contracts
and chattel mortgages at the residence of the purchaser or mortgagor
are directed at giving subsequent purchasers actual notice of liens
against the property. To this end, most courts require that, to comply
with the statute, the instrument must be recorded at the place where
the mortgagor or purchaser maintains his fixed place of abode, even
though he may be domiciled elsewhere. 94
tain domicils elsewhere. Morse v. Lash Motor Co., 107 Conn. 137, 139 Atl. 637
(1927); Robinson v. Fix, 113 Fla. 151, 151 So. 512 (1933).

The Massachusetts

statute, however, is interpreted as exempting all domiciliaries of other states
from the registration requirements. Rummel v. Peters, 314 Mass. 504, 51 N.E.2d
57 (1943).
90. See, e.g., Ashley v. Board of Education, 275 Ill. 274, 114 N.E. 20 (1916); Mt
Hope School District v. Hendrickson, 197 Iowa 191, 197 N.W. 47 (1924); Montgomery v. City of Lebanon, 111 Ky. 646, 64 S.W. 509 (1901); Mancelona Township v. Custer Township, 236 Mich. 677, 211 N.W. 60 (1926); State ex Tel. Mickey
v. Sellech, 76 Neb. 747, 107 N.W. 1022 (1906); Lisbon v. Landaff, 75 N.H. 324,
74 Atl. 186 (1909); People v. Hendrickson, 54 Misc. 337, 104 N.Y. Supp. 122
(Sup. Ct. 1907); Grand Lodge, I.O.O.F. v. Board of Education, 90 W. Va. 8, 110
S.E. 440 (1922).
91. Cline v. Knight, 111 Colo. 8, 137 P.2d 680 (1943); People ex tel. Saxe v.
Board of Education, 206 Ill. App. 381 (1917); Mt. Hope School District v.
Hendrickson, 197 Iowa 191, 197 N.W. 47 (1924); McNish v. State ex tel. Dimick,
74 Neb. 261, 104 N.W. 186 (1905); Mizner v. School District, 2 Neb. Unoff. 238,
96 N.W. 128 (1901).

92. RESTATMMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 30 (1934).
93. Gardner v. Board of Education, 5 Dak. 259, 38 N.W. 433 (1888); State
ex tel. Brown v. Hamilton, 202 Mo. 377, 100 S.W. 609 (1907); Binde v.
Klinge, 30 Mo. App. 285 (1888); Black v. Graham, 238 Pa. 381, 86 Atl. 266
(1913). For a more detailed examination of the interpretation of residence
in school privilege statutes, see KENNAN, RESIDENCE AND DOMICILE 22 (1934).
94. In re Watson, 99 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. Ark. 1951); Commercial Bank of
Crawford v. Pharr, 75 Ga. App. 364 43 S.E.2d 439 (1947); Edwards v. Walker,
162 Misc. 96, 293 N.Y. Supp. 1007 (Co. Ct. 1937); General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Barnett, 142 Misc. 192, 254 N.Y. Supp. 166 (Munic. Ct. 1931); Sheffield
v. Walker, 231 N.C. 556, 58 S.E. 2d 356 (1950); Carroll v. Godding, 26 Erie 196,
supplemented 26 Erie 200 (1943), aff'd, 155 Pa. Super. 490, 38 A.2d 720 (1944).
But the recording must be at a place with which the mortgagor or purchaser
has more than a temporary or transient connection. Combs v. Owen, 182 Ark.
217, 31 S.W.2d 127 (1930); McEntyre v. Bums, 81 Ga. App. 239, 58 S.E.2d 442
(1950); Farmer v. Phillips, 12 Ga. App. 732, 78 S.E. 353 (1913). A few courts
construe the word residence here as equivalent to domicil. See Petition of
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. Persons are usually considered eligible for jury duty as residents if
they maintain a sufficiently close physical connection with the state
or county, despite the fact that their actual domicils may be elsewhere.95 Statutes requiring nonresidents to give security for costs have
sometimes been interpreted to use residence as meaning something else
than domicil;9 6 in other cases however, the term when so used is held
97
equivalent to domicil.
The provision of the National Bankruptcy Act, 98 giving the court
jurisdiction to "Adjudge persons bankrupt who have had their principal place of business, resided or had their domicil" within the district
for the prescribed time, is held to apply not only to domiciliaries, but
also (by reference to the word "resided") to those who have a settled'
physical connection with the place, although domiciled elsewhere.99
However, a mere sojourn or temporary presence is not sufficient. 10
Similarly, residence within enemy territory, as used in the Trading
With The Enemy Act,101 has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as
meaning "something more than mere physical presence and yet something less than domicil."' 0 2
CONCLUSION

By way of summary, residence, rather than domicil, is the word that
is almost invariably employed in statutes. With rare exceptions, of
which certain state income tax statutes are notable examples, 0 3 the statutes themselves give little indication as to the exact meaning attributed
McLauchlan, 1 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1924) (interpreting the Massachusetts statute);
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. First National Bank, 113 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App.
1938).
95. Huckabee v. State, 168 Ala. 27, 53 So. 251 (1910); Graham v. Trimmer,
6 Kan. 230 (1870); People ex rel. Turner v. Plimley, 8 App. Div. 323, 41 N.Y.
Supp. 365 (1st Dep't 1896), affd, 150 N.Y. 571, 44 N.E. 1128 (1896). But cf. State

v. Wimby, 119 La. 139, 43 So. 984 (1907) (domiciliary of parish held qualified
for jury duty despite location of his actual place of abode elsewhere).
96. Monteiro v. St. Just S.S. Co., 123 Misc. 8, 204 N.Y. Supp. 3 (Sup. Ct. 1924)
("It is the actual 'residence' of a plaintiff, and not his 'domicile' that determines
the question of security for costs."); Dean v. Cannon, 37 W. Va. 123, 16 S.E. 444
(1892).

97. Morrison v. Reese, 186 Misc. 133, 58 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Harsh-

barger v. Sherron Metallic Corp., 179 Misc. 1037, 40 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Sup. Ct.
1943).
98. 30 STAT. 545 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § la (1) (Supp. 1952).
99. In re Watson, 99 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. Ark. 1951); In re Lemen, 208 Fed. 80

(N.D. Ohio 1912).

100. In re Garneau, 127 Fed. 677 (7th Cir. 1904); In re Camera, 6 F. Supp.
267 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
101. 40 STAT. 411 (1917), as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 1 et seq. (1951).
102. Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 308, 72 Sup. Ct. 338, 96 L. Ed. 342
(1952). In that case a German citizen, long an American domiciliary, returned
to Germany for a vacation and was involuntarily detained there throughout the
war. The Court held that, "consistent with the emanations of congressional
purpose manifested in the entire Act," Guessefeldt could not be considered a
resident of Germany. 342 U.S. at 312.
103. See note 76 supra.
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to the term. As a result, no guidance is given the courts in their task
of interpretation other than to seek a result which will further what
they conceive to be the central purpose of the legislation in question.
In the majority of cases, residence, when used in a statutory context,
is construed as being synonymous with domicil. Two reasons, it is
believed, are principally responsible for this result. In the first placer
statutes often apply the concept of residence to situations where, un14
der normal conflict of laws rules, domicil provides the crucial test. 0
Here the courts, in the absence of explicit evidence to the contrary,
are naturally loathe to assume that the legislature intended to depart
from the usual rule. Secondly, domicil, despite its difficulties in application, is a concept that is both well known to the courts and reasonably definite in meaning. The opposite is true of residence, which when
used in a sense other than domicil, is one of the most nebulous terms
in the legal dictionary. As such, it is only to be expected that the
courts will apply the better known and more certain standard whenever they feel it possible to do so. Sometimes, however, as in the case
of statutes dealing with divorce jurisdiction, 105 residence is held to
mean something more than domicil. Such an interpretation presents
no particular difficulty since it involves the concept of domicil together with some easily ascertainable and definite fact, as, for example,
physical presence or the maintenance of an actual place of abode. Difficulties do abound, however, in situations where residence is held to
mean something else than domicil. Used in this latter sense, the term
has no constant meaning, although, speaking generally, it can be said
to require a rather well-settled connection with a given locality. But
how to describe this required connection with a lo5ality, how to define
the various meanings of the term and,-in particular, how to differentiate
clearly in words between residence and domicil are problems that still
await solution. As a result, the courts find it difficult even to talk of
residence in language that would not be equally appropriate to domicil.
Even in situations where residence is generally held to differ from
domicil, the distinction between the two concepts is often too shadowy
to be capable of description.
104. As for example, in problems involving judicial jurisdiction or decedents'
estates. See notes 49, 56-57 supra.
105. See notes 22-27 supra.

